Speaker: Dietmar Berwanger (CNRS, ENS Paris-Saclay)
Title: The public contents of private signals
We study a problem of strategic coodination that lies at the intersection between distributed computing and game theory. One insight from the theory of repeated games is that coordination relies on common knowledge about the play history. In games with private monitoring, where players receive a private observation about the outcome of the stage game in every period, coordination tends to become complicated as time proceeds. For games of infinite duration, the strategic coordination problem is not computationally solvable, in general.
In this talk, we present a decomposition approach that separates the information acquired by players into a public and a private part. Public signals can be monitored with perfect recall, whereas the recall structure for private signals should be finite. This perspective reveals several classes of games with incomplete or imperfect information for which the synthesis problem for distributed winning strategies becomes solvable.